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INTRODUCTION

The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) 2 was passed in 1970 as a measure to control organized crime
in the United States. The RICO statute, however, has been used

* Associate Professor of Business Law and Legal Studies, University of Florida. B.A.,
1968, Northwestern University; M.A., 1969, Stanford University; J.D., 1975, Stanford University.
1. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
2. RICO was part of the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA) of 1970. Organized Crime
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Tit. 9, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-68 (1989)).
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creatively and expansively against defendants who bear no obvious
relationship to organized crime.3 RICO has become a powerful tool,
not only to prosecutors 4 but also to plaintiffs in private civil RICO
5
lawsuits .
Although the elements of building a civil RICO case are complex
and technical,6 the statute is flexible and the activity it potentially
covers is broad. Thus applied, it is a powerful weapon in the hands
of a private plaintiff. In the 1980s, RICO's potential use by private
litigants began to unfold through the case law and the literature. 7 As
a vision of the full impact of RICO on American law has developed,
commentators - judicial,8 legislative, 9 and academico - have called
for restraint on the private treble damages action.
In the absence of congressional restraint, the duty to define and
refine the scope of the private civil RICO action falls to the federal
courts. In fact, during the early years of RICO1 the lower federal
courts attempted to restrict the availability of the private RICO ac-

3. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (utility company as
defendant); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (investment
banker as defendant); Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (family member as
defendant in suit over estate fraud); see also Norman Abrams, A New Proposalfor Limiting
Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1989).
4. Joan G. Wexler, Civil RICO Comes of Age: Some MaturationalProblems and Proposals
for Reform, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 285, 291-93 (1983).
5. See G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 1009 (1980); Drew
Alan Campbell, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation: Racketeer or Businessman?, 36
Sw. L.J. 925 (1982).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 15-31.
7. See generally Paul A. Batista, The Uses and Misuses of RICO in Civil Litigation, 8
DEL. J. CORP. L. 181 (1983); G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud in Context: Reflections
on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1982); Wexler, supra note 4, at 35.
8. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985).
9. See generally, Hearings on S. 438 Before the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the House of Representatives Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
10. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 3; Campbell, supra note 5; Wexler, supra note 4; Note,
The Conflict Over RICO's Private Treble Damages Action, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 902 (1985).
11. For a history of the early development of civil RICO, see G. Robert Blakey, The RICO
Civil Fraud Act in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237
(1982); Blakey, supra note 5.

RICO STANDING

tion;12 most of these efforts were overturned by a Supreme Court
unwilling to rationalize Congress' first effort.13 Recently, however, the
Court has constructed standing rules to define better the relationship
between the injury that can be redressed through civil RICO and the
defendant's violation of the RICO statute.
This article explores the developing law of private RICO standing,
including the possible impact of the recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.14 on
private RICO standing law. The article criticizes the use of proximate
cause analysis alone to rationalize RICO standing rules, and it identifies in Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Holmes the elements of
a specific and useful decision model for RICO standing.
II. THE PROBLEM OF STANDING UNDER THE CIVIL RICO ACTION
A. The Private Civil RICO Action
RICO section 1962 makes it unlawful for "any person"'' through a
"pattern of racketeering activity ... to acquire or maintain ... any
interest in . . . any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. '' 16 In addition, section
1962 prohibits use of income derived from a "pattern of racketeering"
17
to acquire or operate an enterprise affecting interstate commerce,

12. Some courts, for example, required proof that the defendant was linked with organized
crime or that the predicate acts were the type of crime committed by organized crime, not
legitimate businesses. Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, sub
nom. Moss v. Newman, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. La. 1981).
13. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 584-85 (1981) (section 1962(c) applies to both
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises).
14. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
15. "Person" is defined to include "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property," 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1988).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
.17. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt in which such a person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
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or to conduct an "enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt,' 8 or to conspire to do any of
the above.' 9
Section 1962(c) prohibits conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering or the collection of unlawful debts. Section 1962(c)
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
of racketeering activity or collection
affairs though a pattern
20
of unlawful debt.
This provision embodies the most malleable language for a RICO
civil damages action, and most private RICO suits routinely include
a claim under 1964(c). It is not necessary to trace illegally-acquired
funds into an enterprise, as is required under sections 1964(a) and (b).
Section 1964(c) broadly prohibits the conduct of an enterprise through
a pattern of racketeering.
Until 1989, the "pattern of racketeering" requirement provided a
potential limitation on the scope of civil RICO. However, in the 1985
case of Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 2' the Court stated in dictum
that two predicate acts were not necessarily a sufficient condition for
a pattern of racketeering.2 Similarly, in the 1989 case of H.J., Inc.
v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,23 the Court did not restrict the
24
definition of a pattern.

18. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c)of this section."

20.

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).

21. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
22. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 (1985) ("in common parlance, two of anything do not
necessarily form a 'pattern"'); see Harold Selan, Interpreting RICO's "Pattern of Racketeering
Activity" Requirement after Sedima: Separate Schemes, Episodes, or Related Acts?, 24 CAL.
W. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1988); Ethan M. Posner, Note, Clarifying a "Pattern"of Confusion: A
Multi-Factor Approach to Civil RICO's Pattern Requirement, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1745 (1988).
23. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
24. The limits of the relationship and continuity concepts that combine to define a RICO
pattern, and the precise methods by which relatedness and continuity or its threat may be
proved, cannot be fixed in advance with such clarity that it will always be apparent whether
in a particular case a "pattern of racketeering activity" exists. The development of these concepts
must await future cases, absent a decision by Congress to revisit RICO to provide clearer
guidance as to the Act's intended scope. H.J., 492 U.S. at 243.

RICO STANDING

"Racketeering activity" is defined in the RICO statute as any one
of many state felonies, including "any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in
obscene matter, or dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs,
which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year, '25 or any act which is indictable under specific
federal criminal statutes. 26 The courts broadly construe the "conduct
of an enterprise" language.27
The underlying criminal violations are known as "predicate acts,"
and their commission in the requisite "pattern" subjects a violator to
both criminal and civil RICO action.? The criminal sanction includes
fines of up to $25,000 and imprisonment of up to 20 years.2 The civil

25. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1990).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1990) lists these federal criminal statutes as predicate acts of
racketeering activity: 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 (bribery); 224 (sports bribery); 471, 472, 473 (counterfeiting); 659 (felonious theft from interstate shipment); 664 (embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds); 891-894 (extortionate credit transactions); 1341 (mail fraud); 1343 (wire fraud); 1503
(obstruction of justice); 1510 (obstruction of state or local law enforcement); 1951 (interference
with commerce, robbery or extortion); 1952 (racketeering); 1953 (interstate transportation of
wagering paraphernalia); 1954 (welfare fraud); 1955 (illegal gambling businesses); 2314-2315
(transport of stolen property); 2341-2346 (trafficking in contraband cigarettes); 2421-2424 (white
slavery). In addition, section 1961(1)(C) and (D) identifies acts indictable under the federal
securities laws and drug laws, and acts indictable under provisions of the federal criminal code
related to union funds as "racketeering acts." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(C),(D).
27. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) ("The enterprise is an entity, for
present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in
a course of conduct .... The [enterprise] is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization,

formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.").
28. The precise elements of a RICO violation that must be proved depends upon which
subsection of § 1962 is alleged to have been violated. Section 1962(a) makes it unlawful for a
person to use or invest income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an
interest in an enterprise. Section 1962(b) addresses efforts to acquire or maintain control of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1962(c) prohibits a person employed
by or associated with an enterprise from conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1962(d) prohibits conspiracies to violate §§ 1962(a)1962(c).
29. In addition, RICO provides for forfeiture to the United States of
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962;
and (2) any (A) interest in; (B) security of; (C) claim against; or property or (D)
contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over; any enterprise
which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated
in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1990).
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sanction provides for broad injunctive relief in the federal courts30 and
a treble damages action in favor of injured parties.'
B.

The Nature of RICO Standing

In the early years of RICO, the federal courts pursued an expansive
interpretation of the scope of criminal RICO.3 In the first ten years
after it became law, RICO was used primarily as a prosecutorial tool
against organized crime. In United States v. Turkette,3 and again in
Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, - the Supreme Court held that the use of
RICO need not be limited to organized crime, but could be extended
to other enterprises that fell within its language. These decisions led
to expansive use of the civil RICO action to augment or replace ordinary commercial and state law suits with a federal treble damages
cause of action. Since the same predicate act can be the basis of a
criminal or a civil suit, the expanded scope of the criminal action
potentially expanded the scope of the civil action as well.
The criminal law, however, does not require the court, or the
prosecutor, to identify precisely the incidence of the injury inflicted
by a violation of the law; proof of violation of the law is sufficient to
sustain a criminal judgment. The judgment for civil recovery, however,
requires that the incidence of injury be identified to the particular
plaintiff in the lawsuit. Standing doctrine provides the analytical
framework for sorting out which persons, among those on whom the
incidence of injury falls, ought to be compensated on account of the

30. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1988).
31. The civil damages provision states: "Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1990). The injury must result
in tangible financial loss to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Oscar v. University Students Co-operative
Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1992); Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Icahn, 946 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1991);
Berg v. First State Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1990).
32. The statute provides for liberal construction: "The provisions of ...
[RICO] shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No 91-452, § 904 (a), 84 Stat. 947. For a history of this provision and of the early
construction of the criminal statutes, see Blakey, supra note 11, at 245-47 n.25.
33. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
34. 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) ("[Legitimate businesses] enjoy neither an inherent incapacity
for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences.").

RICO STANDING

defendant's wrongdoing. In addition, the "by reason of' language in
section 1964(c) introduces an element that does not pertain to the
criminal action. The language implies a necessary causal nexus between
the defendant's RICO violation and the plaintiffs injury. Standing
doctrine is used to identify and test the sufficiency of the causal nexus
in a particular case.
The precise dimensions of RICO standing doctrine remain uncertain." However, in the Sedima36 decision, the Court required a "proximate cause" analysis for civil RICO standing, and in its 1992 decision
in Holmes v. S.I.P.C.,37 the Court affirmed the opinions of the lower
federal courts8 that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury suffered was "directly," as well as "proximately," caused by the defendant's violation of the RICO statute.
C. Pre-Sedima Private RICO Standing Theories
In adjudicating the RICO treble damages cases, the lower federal
courts sought to rationalize and limit the potentially expansive reach
of the private RICO action. The Supreme Court rejected these efforts,
apparently in the hope that Congress would curb the reach of the
law. In 1984, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit required a civil RICO plaintiff to allege that the
defendant had been convicted of the predicate acts of racketeering, 39
and held the plaintiff to a criminal, rather than civil, standard of
proof.40 On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected this approach,41 finding
no authority for it in the language or legislative history of the statute.
Similarly, in H.J. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,42 the Supreme
Court rejected the lower court's restrictive view of the "pattern" element that the plaintiff must show in civil RICO.

35. See generally Laura Ginger, Causationand Civil RICO Standing: When Is a Plaintiff
Injured "By Reason Of' a RICO Violation?, 64 ST. J.L. REV. 849 (1990).
36. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
37. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
38. See, e.g., Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l
Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988); Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988); Haroco,
Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
39. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1084), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
40. Id. at 503-04.
41. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
42. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
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Another approach of the lower courts focused on the language of
section 1964(c), "injured in his business or property by reason of,"
and analogized to the similar language of section 4 of the Clayton Act.
In antitrust jurisprudence, this language has been construed narrowly,
to require that the plaintiff show "antitrust injury."' 43 In other words,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that it has suffered the kind of loss
the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. 44 In the context of antitrust analysis, the antitrust injury requirement has forced explicit
5
analysis of the purpose and goals of antitrust.
Drawing from section 4 analysis, the Second Circuit articulated a
theory of "racketeering injury" which the court described as an injury
"different in kind from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts
themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate acts, but also caused
by an activity which RICO was designed to deter."' "4 Other lower
federal courts devised a standing requirement of "competitive injury,"
which also had antecedent roots in antitrust. To prove "competitive
injury" one would have to demonstrate "the kind of economic injury
which has an effect on competition. ' ' 4 7 Courts that adopted the competitive injury theory .reasoned that RICO provides a remedy only for
plaintiffs who have been injured as a result of the competitive advantage of defendants who operate a business through racketeering.48 In
Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, the United States Supreme Court firmly
rejected the "racketeering injury" and "competitive injury" approaches.

43. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990); Associated
General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Blue Shield
of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477 (1977).
44. Antitrust injury doctrine ensures "that the harm claimed by the plaintiff corresponds
to that rationale for finding a violation of the antitrust laws in the first place ...." Atlantic
Richfield, 495 U.S. at 342; see Virginia G. Maurer, Antitrust and RICO: Standing on the
Slippery Slope, 25 GA. L. REV. 711, 717-27 (1991).
45. Maurer, supra note 44, at 729-41.
46. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496; see also Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d
408 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding racketeering enterprise injury), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986);
Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984) (mail and wire fraud allegations also insufficient
to plead racketeering injury), vacated sub. nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 473 U.S. 922 (1985).
47. Sedinma, 741 F.2d at 495 n.40, 496.
48. See North Barrington Dev., Inc., v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ill.
1980); see
also Batista, supra note 7; Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial
Restrictions, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101 (1982).

RICO STANDING

D. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Sedima was very
important in the development of RICO jurisprudence. Sedima,
S.P.R.L. (Sedima) and Imrex Co. (Imrex) entered into a joint venture
to sell electronic equipment. When the relationship deteriorated,
Sedima sued Imrex based on seven common law claims, including
breach of contract, quasi-contract, and breach of a fiduciary duty, as
well as three RICO violations. The RICO violations were based on
predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy. 49 The district
court dismissed the RICO claims on summary judgment, ruling that
a private RICO claim could be properly stated only if the injury
alleged differed in some material way from the type of injury that
would result directly from the predicate acts alone. 5°
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff failed to allege
"racketeering injury." The court said the plaintiff should have alleged
injury "by reason of a violation of section 1962."' 5 Moreover, the court
held that a civil RICO action could be brought only after a criminal
conviction.52
In deciding the case on appeal, the United States Supreme Court
faced a split in the circuits on the issue of racketeering injury,- as
well as a growing sentiment throughout the legal community that
RICO was widely misused and in need of rationalization.5 Nevertheless, the Court refused to restrict RICO further. The majority opinion
found no basis in the statute for the prior criminal conviction requirement. 55 In addition, it soundly rejected the concept of racketeering

49. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 485.
50. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 741 F.2d
482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
51. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494.
52. Id. at 490.
53. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 490. The "racketeering injury" requirement was substantially
rejected in Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984),
affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408 (8th
Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 473 U.S. 922, adhered to in relevant part, 770 F.2d 717 (8th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); and Alcorn County, Miss. v. United States
Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1984).
54. Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, ABA SEC. ON CORP., BANKING &
BUSINESS LAW (1985).
55. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493 ("In sum, we can find no support in the statute's history, its
language, or considerations of policy for a requirement that a private treble damages action
under § 1964(c) can proceed only against a defendant who has already been criminally convicted.").
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injury, finding "no room in the statutory language for an additional,
amorphous 'racketeering injury' requirement. ' 56 Moreover, in analysis
protective of the broad application of RICO, the Court did not find
an underlying RICO injury beyond the predicate acts, an underlying
purpose beyond buttressing deterrence of the predicate acts, or an
underlying purpose of the civil RICO action beyond filling "prosecutorial gaps.' ' 57 It found the search for "an injury caused by conduct that
RICO was designed to deter to be 'unhelpfully tautological'. "'
Sedima signaled rejection of the idea that RICO was designed to
buttress the antitrust laws, or that the Court was willing to engraft
onto RICO the body of doctrine it had developed through nearly one
hundred years of construing private antitrust actions. The majority
noted Congress' intent in the legislative history to avoid creating "inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of . . . a private
litigant [who] would have to contend with a body of precedent appropriate in a purely antitrust context - setting strict requirements
on questions such as 'standing to sue' and 'proximate cause'."5 9 It
criticized the Second Circuit: "In borrowing its 'racketeering injury'
requirement from antitrust standing principles, the court below
created exactly the problems Congress sought to avoid." 6°
The majority opinion in Sedima signalled disapproval of narrow
judicial restrictions on the reach of private RICO6 1 by rejecting the
"racketeering injury" theory, which would place severe limits on the
scope of the action. However, the Court did restrict private RICO
somewhat by requiring a broad proximate cause test for identifying
the harm attributable to violation of the predicate acts: "Where the
plaintiff alleges each element of the violation, the compensable injury
necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related
to constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation is the commis-

Id. at 495.
Id. at 498-500.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 498-99.
This less restrictive reading is amply supported by our prior cases and the
general principles surrounding this statute. RICO is to be read broadly. This is
the lesson not only of Congress' self-consciously expansive language and overall
approach . . . but also of its express admonition that RICO is to be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.... The statute's "remedial purposes"
are nowhere more evident than in the provision of a private action for those injured
by racketeering activity.
Id. at 497-98.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

RICO STANDING

sion of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise. '62
In the context of the Sedima facts and the Court's opinions, even this
potential narrowing of private RICO lacked force because the proximate cause test arguably could result in recovery for both direct and
indirect consequences of the defendant's actions, particularly those
injuries that flowed from competitive losses.E. Post-Sedima Standing Decisions
After Sedima, the lower federal courts attended closely to the
causation element of section 1964 in private RICO cases. Cause in
fact, or "but for" causation, was identified explicitly as an essential
element of the plaintiffs case. 64 The lower federal courts also required
"proximate cause. '"- The use of proximate cause analysis resulted in
distinctions between plaintiffs whose injuries were directly caused by
the predicate violations and those whose injuries were indirectly
caused by the predicate violations.
Some lower federal courts limited standing to those directly injured,66 but others permitted recovery for indirect injuries. 67 Sperber

62.
63.

Id. at 480.
Id. at 497 n.15 (majority agreed that private RICO damages "include, but are not

limited to, the sort of competitive injury for which the dissenters allow recovery"). The dissenters, favoring the doctrine of "racketeering injury," had argued that Congress was less concerned
for direct victims and was more concerned for "the competitors and investors whose businesses
and interests are harmed . . .or whose competitive positions decline because of infiltration in
the relevant market." Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Albert A. Citro, III, Note, After
Sedima, The Lower Courts' Use of Proximate Cause as a Limitation on Civil RICO, 16 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 607, 623 (1991).
64. See Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades,
859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989); Bastian v. Petren Resources
Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990); Zervas v. Faulkner, 861
F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1988); see also, Citro, supra note 63.
65. See O'Malley v. O'Neill, 887 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926
(1990); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988); Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60
(2d Cir. 1988). But see Bankers Trust Corp. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).
66. See, e.g., Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991); Norman v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1989); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d

527 (2d Cir. 1989); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. 1988) (whistleblower); National Enterprise, Inc. v. Mellon Fin. Services, Corp., 847 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1988);
Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir. 1987) (whistleblower); Nodine
v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987); Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d
806 (7th Cir. 1987); Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926 (11th Cir. 1987); Giuffre v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
67. Prior to Sedima, the Seventh Circuit permitted recovery for both indirect and direct
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v. Boesky, illustrates the limitation of standing to plaintiffs directly
injured. Plaintiffs alleged injury when the market price of six stocks
they owned dropped following the announcement by the Securities
and Exchange Commission that Ivan Boesky had been involved in
widespread insider trading. Plaintiffs claimed to have paid a price
inflated by Boesky's racketeering-created reputation, and to have suffered a loss when the price fell as a result of Boesky's lost reputation.
The Second Circuit invoked classic proximate causation analysis. The
court balanced the express statutory intent that RICO is to be construed broadly6 9 with the principle that legal liability should not extend
as far as factual causation; moreover, observed the Second Circuit,
the limit of legal liability lies, inevitably, in public policy. 70 Using tort
law framework of proximate cause and foreseeability analysis, the
Second Circuit found the factual relationship between plaintiffs' injuries and Boesky's illegal activities to be too attenuated for those
activities to be the proximate cause of the injuries. Although Boesky's
actions were an indirect causal factor of plaintiffs injury, a consider7
ation of "social policy . . . based on shared principles of justice' 1

injury, Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984),
affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) ("The criminal conduct in violation of section 1962 must, directly or
indirectly, have injured the plaintiffs business or property."). After Sedima, substantial support
continued for this position. See Shaw v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Flip Side Prod., Inc. v. Jam Prods., Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024, 1035 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 909 (1988) (holding, however, that plaintiffs injury was too tenuous for RICO standing);
Ocean Energy II, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 744 (5th Cir. 1989);
Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823, 833 (5th Cir. 1988) ("A requirement that the nexus between
the injury and a predicate act be 'direct' may, at least in some circumstances, be overly restrictive."); Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Prods., Inc., 831 F.2d 596, 606 (6th Cir.
1987); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987); City of Milwaukee v. Universal
Mortgage Corp., 692 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
68. 849 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988).
69. [T]he Supreme Court has set out "general principles surrounding this statute,"
one of which is that "RICO is to be read broadly" not only because of "Congress'
self-consciously expansive language and overall approach" ... but also because of
Congress' "express admonition that RICO is to 'be liberally construed to effectuate
its remedial purposes."'
Sperber, 849 F.2d at 63.
70. As a leading treatise explains "[i]n a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act
go forward to eternity," and extending liability as far as factual causation therefore "would
result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would 'set society on edge and fill the courts
with endless litigation.' . . . Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any
act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy." (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, ET
AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF,TORTS 264 (5th ed. 1984); Sperber, 849 F.2d at 63.
71. Sperber, 849 F.2d at 65.
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compelled the conclusion that Congress did not intend liability to reach
such remote and indirect injuries.
In addition, the lower courts after Sedima distinguished between
plaintiffs whose injuries were indirect and those who were not the
real parties in interest in the lawsuit. These courts denied standing
to plaintiffs whose injuries were derived from the injuries of victims
more directly related to the racketeering activity, such as creditors,72
74 union members, 75 employee and officers,76
shareholders, 73 taxpayers,
77
and whistleblowers.
For example, in Carter v. Berger7 8 the Seventh Circuit ruled that
a plaintiff whose injuries from fraud were derivative through a third
party more proximate to the defendant's wrongdoing lacked standing
to bring a civil RICO action against the defendant. Berger had pleaded

72. See, e.g., Whalen v. Carter, 954 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Sunrise Secs. Litig.,
916 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990); Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333
(7th Cir. 1989) (guarantors); National Enters., Inc. v. Mellon Fin. Servs., 847 F.2d 251 (5th
Cir. 1988); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr.
Co., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988). Cf. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1107 (1989).
73. See, e.g., Whalen v. Carter, 954 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Lipton, 947 F.2d
998 (1st Cir. 1991); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1990); Rylewicz v. Beaton Serv.,
Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1989); Flynn v. Merrick, 881 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1989); Leach v.
FDIC, 860 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989); Sparling v. Hoffman
Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988); Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347
(5th Cir. 1987) (minority shareholders in a non-derivative action); NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Tiller,
814 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1987) (corporation, not shareholders, directly injured); Roeder v. Alpha
Indus., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987); Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986) (shareholders); Warren v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 759 F.2d
542 (6th Cir. 1985) (shareholders and employees). However, a shareholder may be able to pursue
a direct action for a non-derivative injury, In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 916 F.2d 874 (3d Cir.
1990); Ocean Energy II, 868 F.2d at 740.
74. Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985).
75. See, e.g., Adams-Lundy v. Association of Professional Flight Attendants, 844 F.2d 245
(5th Cir. 1988); Bass v. Campagnone, 838 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988).
76. Miller v. Helmsley, 745 F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Gurnitz v. Guindon, 1991 WL
1009 (E.D. Pa.). Bennett v. Centerpoint Bank, 761 F. Supp. 908 (D. N.H. 1991).
77. Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corp., 912 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990); Reddy v. Litton
Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990); Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d
21 (2d Cir. 1990); O'Malley v. O'Neill, 887 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
926 (1990); Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir. 1987); Nodine v.
Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987); Acampora v. Boise Cascade Corp., 635 F. Supp.
66 (D.N.J. 1986); Ginett v. Computer Task Group, Inc., 1991 WL 5133 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Hunt
v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986).
78. 777 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985).
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guilty to charges of bribing public employees to obtain lower tax
assessments for property of his clients. The charges to which he pled
guilty constituted predicate acts under civil RICO. Other taxpayers,
therefore, filed suit against Berger to recover the incremental taxes
that they had to pay to compensate for Berger's client's tax savings.
Analogizing to the direct purchaser rule in antitrust,7 the court
explained the policy bases for concentrating recovery, and the incentive to recover, in the hands of the directly injured party. The indirectly injured party "should look to the recovery of the directly injured
party, not to the wrongdoer, for relief."s ° Although Sedima eschewed
the analogy to antitrust injury in its treatment of racketeering injury
theory, the court still found parallels between the two statutes.
Such conflicts in the lower federal courts illustrated the need for
Supreme Court direction on how to apply Sedima's proximate cause
analysis to plaintiffs whose injuries were direct, indirect, and derivative. Equally important, the lower courts required direction about the
relationship of proximate cause analysis and standing, particularly in
private RICO cases based on violations of federal statutes for which
independent federal civil causes of action were available and for which
a balanced body of standing law was well-developed. In particular,
plaintiffs precluded by the standing rules for federal securities claims
increasingly reframed these complaints under section 1964(c), claiming
violation of the federal securities laws as predicate acts. s ' Thus,
Holmes,82 which involved such a complaint, provided a provident set
of facts for certiorari.

79. Id. at 1175; Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
80. Carter, 777 F.2d at 1176.
81. See Andrew P. Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraudin the Sale of
Securities," 18 GA. L. REV. 43 (1983); Jennifer L. Johnson, PredatorsRights: Multiple Remedies
for Wall Street Sharks Under the Securities Laws and RICO, 10 J. CORP. L. 3 (1984); Louis
C. Long, Treble Damages for Violations of the FederalSecurities Laws: A Suggested Analysis
and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201 (1981); Jeffrey G.
Machtosh, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: Powerful New Tool of the
Defrauded Securities Plaintiff, 31 KAN. L. REV. 7 (1982); Arthur F. Mathews, Shifting the
Burden of Losses in the Securities Markets: The Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation,
65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 896 (1990); William C. Tyson & Andrew A. August, The Williams
Act After RICO: Has the Balance Tipped in Favor of Incumbent Management?, 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 53 (1983); Note, Application of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) to Securities Violations, 8 J. CORP. L. 411 (1983).
82. Holmes v. SIPC, 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
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III. THE NEXT STEP: HOLMES V. SECURITIES INVESTOR
PROTECTION CORP.83

A. Factual Background of the Case
The plaintiff, Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC),
is a private nonprofit corporation established by Congress.8 Virtually
all broker-dealers registered under section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act are required to be members of the SIPC. 3 When a brokerdealer member fails to meet its obligations to customers, SIPC is
required to liquidate the member's business in an orderly fashion, in
such a way as to protect customer's accounts, and to advance up to
$500,000 per customer to meet customer claims that cannot be satisfied
out of liquidation assets of the broker-dealer.86
In 1981 SIPC sought decrees from the United States District
Courts for the Southern District of Florida and the Central District
of California to protect the customers of First State Securities Corporation (FSSC) and Joseph Sebag, Inc. (Sebag), respectively. SIPC
then proceeded to liquidate these broker-dealers. Two years later
SIPC and the trustees for FSSC and Sebag brought suit in the California federal district court against some 75 defendants, accusing them
of conspiracy in fraudulent schemes that led to the demise of FSSC
and Sebag.
Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that defendant Robert G. Holmes
made false statements about the prospects of a firm of which he was
an officer, director, and a major shareholder, and that he sold small
amounts of another company's stock for the purpose of simulating a
liquid market. These acts, claimed the plaintiffs, violated section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 193487 and the federal mail and wire
fraud statutes,8 and constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity"
within the meaning of RICO.
Plaintiffs sought treble damages under the civil recovery sections
of RICO. 89 The relationship between these acts and the SIPC is that

83.

Id.

84. Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), Pub. L. 91-598, § 1(a), Dec. 30, 1970, 84
Stat. 1636, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa78111.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2)(A) (1988).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (1988).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988), SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
88. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1990).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988 ed. and Supp. I).
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1) the broker-dealers purchased the stocks that were the subject of
the defendants' fraud; 2) public perception of the fraud caused the
market price of the stocks to fall; 3) lower market prices caused the
broker-dealers to fail; and 4) SIPC lost money. After five years of
litigation, the district court granted summary judgment to Holmes on
the RICO claims, on the ground that SIPC had not purchased or sold
securities and therefore lacked standing to assert RICO claims based
on violations of the federal securities laws.- In addition, the court
held that Holmes' alleged actions were not the proximate cause of
SIPC's injury.9'
In an interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's holding and reversed
and remanded the case.92 The appellate court held that while a plaintiff
suing under the implied private right of action under the broad federal
securities fraud statute, section 10b and Rule 10b(5), must allege the
"purchase or sale" of a security, a plaintiff suing under section 1964(c)
of RICO need not do so. In addition, the appellate court found the
district court's application of proximate cause analysis to have too
narrow a factual basis. The district court had looked only at Holmes'
direct actions, not at the whole fact complex for which he could be
held responsible.The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues:
whether SIPC had a right to sue under RICO, and whether Holmes
could be held responsible for the actions of co-conspirators. Justice
Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.- Justice O'Connor, joined
95
by Justices White and Stevens, concurred in a separate opinion.
Justice Scalia concurred in another separate opinion.- The decision
was unanimous to deny SIPC the right to sue in RICO; the three
opinions, however, represent quite distinct views of the problem of
standing in civil RICO cases.
B. The Souter Opinion
Justice Souter's opinion focused on proximate cause to identify
which injuries caused by a RICO violation ought to be compensable.
The majority reasoned that Congress modelled the civil damages pro-

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1316.
Id.
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990).
Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1316.
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1327.
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vision in the RICO statute on section 4 of the Clayton Act, 97 on to
which a proximate cause requirement had long been engrafted 9s In
addition, the Court adopted the "direct injury" requirement of antitrust standing99 into civil RICO. Under the direct injury rule, recovery
is concentrated in the hands of the party injured directly by the illegal
activity. When the injury to a plaintiff is mediated by the injuries of
a third party, the direct injury requirement is not met. To permit
recovery under these circumstances would require complicated proof
of causation and damages to separate the effects of the defendant's
actions and those of the third party. In addition, a direct injury rule
prevents diffusion of the incentive of the directly injured party to
recover.
Using the tools of proximate cause and direct injury, the Court
analyzed the relationship between the stock manipulation alleged and
the customer's harm and found it derivative of the broker-dealer's
harm. Even if SIPC were subrogated to the rights of the customers
of the broker-dealers, the losses of those customers would not flow
directly from the stock manipulations. The customers suffer loss only
because of the insolvent condition of the broker-dealers. The cause of
insolvency may be complex: it may result from the stock manipulation,
or from the broker-dealers' lack of foresight or business judgment.
Even if multiple causes could be identified, fragmented damage awards
would have to be apportioned, opening the door to "massive and complex damages litigation."' 10
In a short final part of the opinion, the Court dismissed the need
to decide the controversial issue 10 of whether a RICO plaintiff alleging
a predicate violation of the securities laws need allege "sale or purchase" of a security. Since the decision could be disposed of on proxi-

Id. at 1317. The relevant provision of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, states:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore . . .and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
98. Holmes, 112 S.Ct. at 1317-18. "We may fairly credit the 91st Congress, which enacted
RICO, with knowing the interpretation federal courts had given the words earlier Congresses
had used first in § 7 of the Sherman Act, and later in the Clayton Act's § 4." Id.
99. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (union lacked
standing to sue for losses sustained when multi-employer association coerced association members
into dealing with nonunion firms); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hawaii v.
Standard Oil of Calif., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
100. Holmes, 112 S.Ct. at 1321 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors,459 U.S. at 545).
101. See supra note 81.
97.
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mate cause analysis, the Court did not reach the standing issue or
address the relationship between the federal securities laws and the
federal racketeering laws.
C. The O'Connor Opinion
Justice O'Connor's opinion is important because it engages the civil
RICO standing issue and indicates these three justices' moderately
expansive view of civil RICO. The O'Connor view would not necessarily require a sale or purchase of a security to sustain standing under
civil RICO. O'Connor agreed with the proximate cause analysis of the
majority, but argued that the prior question of standing required the
court to consider whether a civil RICO plaintiff needed to allege a
"purchase or sale" of a security to use the federal securities laws as
a predicate offense to support civil RICO. The standing issue, argued
Justice O'Connor, is both analytically distinct from and prior to the
issue of proximate cause. The majority, in contrast, had found it unnecessary to reach the "purchase or sale" issue on the ground that
proximate cause analysis was dispository.
The issue of whether a purchase or sale is required arises out of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which makes it
unlawful for any person to use "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security," any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of the rules or regulations of the Securities
Exchange Commission.102 SEC Rule 10b-5 prohibits manipulative or
deceptive acts "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."103 Although the statute does not provide a civil cause of action
for violation of section 10(b), the Court has created an implied right
of action'0 and required that a plaintiff in such an action have purchased or sold securities in order to have standing to bring the action. 105
Justice O'Connor's opinion takes as its starting point a textual
analysis of the civil RICO statute, comparing it with the Court's
analysis of the "purchase or sale" requirement under the implied civil
right of action under section 10(b). In Holmes, the civil action was
brought under section 1964(c) of the RICO Act,-3 which is predicated

102. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1991).
103. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
104. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
105. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733.
106. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1323.
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on section 1962. Section 1962 makes it unlawful for any person who
has engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity" to invest, maintain
an interest, or participate in any enterprise that is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. 0 7 Section 1961 defines "racketeering activity" to include various state and federal offenses, including "any offense
involving . . . fraud in the sale of securities . . . punishable under
any law of the United States.' 0 8 Thus, the text of the civil RICO
statute requires the plaintiff to allege violation of a criminal securities
fraud law as a predicate act to violation of RICO.
In Justice O'Connor's textual analysis, the words "any person" do
not require explicitly that the plaintiff allege a purchase or sale of a
security. Similarly, the words "in his business or property" are necessarily broader than a purchase or sale requirement. O'Connor says
that the majority construes "by reason of"' to require only a proximate
relationship between the defendant's action and the plaintiffs harm,
a requirement that "cannot itself preclude a nonpurchaser or nonseller
of securities, alleging predicate acts of fraud in the sale of securities,
from bringing suit under § 1964(c)."109
Holmes argued that section 1964(c) would require the plaintiff to
establish his right to sue under the predicate act in order to sue under
civil RICO. Justice O'Connor attacked the illogic of this position in
two ways. First, textual analysis of section 1964(c) reveals a focus on
injury, not on the legal right to sue for a predicate act. Second,
O'Connor reasoned that a requirement of standing under the predicate
act would reduce, logically, to the conclusion that only the government
would have standing to sue; the vast majority of predicate acts are
criminal statutes under which only the government can sue.
To this argument Justice O'Connor added the textual argument
that section 1961 focuses on offenses "punishable" under the securities
laws, not on offenses recoverable under these laws.110 Therefore, section 1964(c) plainly requires the plaintiff to establish the elements of
a criminal action in order to bring a civil RICO suit, not the elements
of a civil action to redress the violation of the criminal wrong. Thus,
section 1964(c) provides an independent civil cause of action for violation of the securities laws.
Even within this analysis, however, it is possible to find a "purchase
or sale" requirement for civil RICO. Section 1961 refers to "any offense

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1323; 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1324.
Id.
Id. at 1324-25.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5

involving . . . fraud in the sale of securities . . . punishable under
any law of the United States." Thus, arguably, the requirement of
privity of sale could be inferred. The flaw in this theory, however, is
that section 1961 defines "racketeering" for both the criminal and the
civil RICO actions, and it is not possible that Congress would have
required the government, as prosecutor under criminal RICO, to have
purchased or sold securities in order to establish standing to bring a
criminal lawsuit. And Justice O'Connor finds "not tenable" the argument that the purchase or sale requirement might apply only to civil
RICO actions and not to criminal actions: "By including a private right
of action in RICO, Congress intended to bring "the pressure of 'private
attorneys general' on a serious national problem for which prosecutorial
resources [were] deemed inadequate.""11
Next, O'Connor addressed the textual argument that the logic of
the "purchase or sale" requirement for civil actions under section 10(b)
applies with equal force to section 1964(c), both drawing their limits
from the section 10(b) language, "fraud in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." To this argument, O'Connor responds that
the reasoning of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,112 in which
the Court established the implied right of action under section 10(b)
only for those who purchased or sold securities, rested not on the
language of section 10(b), from which the Court was unable "to divine
. . . the express 'intent of Congress' as to the contours of a private
cause of action under Rule lOb-5," 113 but on "the relationship between
§ 10(b) and other provisions of the securities laws.., and the practical
difficulties in granting standing in the absence of an executed transaction, . . . neither of which are relevant in the RICO context.1114 In
addition, Justice O'Connor noted that in Blue Chip Stamps it was the
Court that outlined the contours of an implied action. In RICO, however, Congress has explicitly created a private cause of action; the
Court is obliged to follow the contours of the action Congress created,
without restricting the application of the statute beyond Congress'
language.
Finally, Justice O'Connor addressed the argument that the language in section 1961, "fraud in the sale of securities," is inherently

111. Id. at 1325 (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S.
143, 151 (1987)).
112. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
113. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1326 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737).
114. Id.
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narrower than the language of section 10(b), "fraud in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security" (emphasis added). The logic of
this argument posits that the narrower language of the RICO definition
justifies a purchase or sale requirement for RICO recovery. That is,
fraud in the sale of a security is more restrictive than fraud in connection with the sale of a security. To this argument, Justice O'Connor
replied:
To the extent that there is a meaningful difference between
Congress' choice of "in" as opposed to "in connection with,"
I do not view it as limiting the class of RICO plaintiffs to
those who were parties to a sale. Rather, consistent with
today's decision, I view it as confining the class of defendants
to those proximately responsible for the plaintiffs injury and
excluding those only tangentially "connect[ed] with" it. 115
The effect of Justice O'Connor's opinion is to signal to the lower
federal courts these justices' inclination not to apply the Blue Chip
Stamps "purchase or sale" requirement to civil RICO suits based on
the federal securities laws. More importantly, however, this opinion
signals an inclination to view civil RICO as a distinctly independent
federal cause of action and to view civil RICO standing as a matter
of textual interpretation. The implication is that these justices would
not engraft onto section 1964(c) standing requirements based on extraneous policy not detectable in the language of section 1964(c).
O'Connor's lenient posture toward the application of RICO is consistent
with the reasoning of Sedima and other cases rejecting the importation
of antitrust doctrine into RICO standing, but it differs from the reasoning of the majority.
D. The Scalia Opinion
Like Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia views civil RICO as a distinctly independent federal cause of action, not dependent on the antitrust laws for standing analysis. While supportive of the majority's
proximate cause analysis, Justice Scalia invokes a standing analysis
that transcends the O'Connor textual analysis of section 1964(c).
In Justice Scalia's analysis, the ultimate question presented by the
Holmes facts is statutory standing, which he defines as the issue
"[w]hether the so-called nexus (mandatory legalese for 'connection')
between the harm of which this plaintiff complains and the defendant's

115.

Id.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5

so-called predicate acts is of the sort that will support an action under
civil RICO."116 Proximate cause is an element of standing which is
required, not because of civil RICO's section 4 Clayton Act analogue,
but because "it has always been the practice of common-law courts
(and probably of all courts, under all legal systems) to require as a
condition of recovery, unless the legislature specifically prescribes
otherwise, that the injury have been proximately caused by the offend'
ing conduct.1 17
In addition to proximate cause, Justice Scalia would make compliance with the "zone of interests" test an element of standing. This
test "seeks to determine whether, apart from the directness of the
injury, the plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be benefitted by the provision at issue." ' s The source for this test lies not in
textual analysis but in the "background practice against which Congress legislates."119 In short, it lies within the inherent prerogative of
the federal courts to limit the effect of congressional language to its
implied purposes. While the language "injured in his business or property by reason of' may mean plaintiffs who are not so injured may
not sue, it does not mean that all plaintiffs so injured may sue. In
the same way that courts may infer a requirement of proximate cause,
they may also infer Congress' purpose in passing the statute and
restrict standing to those whom Congress intended to protect.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia posits that each predicate act under
civil RICO involves a distinct "zone of interests." The applicable zone
of interests test will vary with the underlying violation. Thus, when
a court interprets a civil statute that provides recovery for violation
of a criminal act, as in civil RICO or civil antitrust, the court would
identify the kind of personal interests that the criminal statute was

116. Id. at 1327.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1326. The "zone of interests" test for standing developed in the context of
establishing the "case or controversy" requirement of the federal constitution, U.S.C.A. CONST.
art. 3, § 1, without which federal courts lack jurisdiction to try cases. Association of Data
Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1969). In the context of administrative
law, the "zone of interests" test identifies whether Congress intended for a particular class of
plaintiffs to be relied upon to challenge an agency's disregard of the law, Clarke v. Securities
Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 389. In the context of a federal statutory cause of action, the
"zone of interest" test identifies Congress' intent to confer the right to sue on a particular class
of persons injured by violation of the statute, FMC, Corp. v. Boesky, 852 F.2d 981, 988 (1988)
("The [zone of interest test] might be referred to as a 'statutory' standing limitation in that the
particular federal statute the plaintiff seeks to invoke must afford the plaintiff a right to relief.").
119. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1328 (citing Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340,
345-48 (1984)).
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designed to protect, and limit civil recovery to plaintiffs whose interests lie within the protected zones of interests.
IV. A CRITIQUE: WHY PROXIMATE CAUSE Is NOT ENOUGH
A.

Antitrust as Precedent

The Holmes opinion is curious in many respects. For example, it
was unnecessary for Justice Souter to rely on Clayton Act precedents
to reach proximate cause as an analytical tool. Proximate cause
analysis inheres in statutory or common law causes of action, as Justice
Scalia observed. Justice Souter's reliance on antitrust departs from
the Court's prior approach in Sedima, which eschewed Clayton Act
precedents for determining who can sue in private RICO cases. Similarly, it is curious that while Justice Souter restricted standing under
section 1964 to plaintiffs directly injured by violation of the predicate
acts, and seemingly eliminated those whose injuries flowed only indirectly from the violation, he did not analogize from Illinois Brick v.
Illinois,120 the major Clayton Act case establishing the direct injury
rule in antitrust analysis. Finally, it is curious that Justice Souter's
opinion, which arguably reiterated the derivative injury rule of Carter
v. Berger,12 1 skirted the question of applying the "purchase or sale"
requirement of Blue Chip Stamps in private RICO cases.
Of these various curiosities, the reliance on antitrust precedent
may be of lasting significance. There is precedent for the Court's
reliance on antitrust to provide guidance in private RICO construction.
In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc, for
example, the Court inferred the same four-year statute of limitations
that expressly governs federal antitrust claims. On the other hand,
in Tafflin v. Levitt,12 the Court rejected the view that, in patterning
section 1964(c) after section 4, Congress impliedly conferred exclusive
jurisdiction over civil RICO claims to the federal judiciary.24 Thus,
in its consideration of the relationship between private antitrust and

120.
121.
122.
123.

431
777
483
110

U.S. 720 (1977).
F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
U.S. 143 (1987).
S. Ct. 792 (1990) (holding that states have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO

claims); see Michael P. Kenny, RICO and Federalism: A Case for ConcurrentJurisdiction,31

B.C.L. REv. 239 (1990).
124. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Clayton Act section 4 cases.
eral Inv. Co. v. Lake Short & Mich. S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261 (1922).
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private RICO, the Court has held open the possibility of distinct
interpretive rules for RICO, while recognizing the Clayton Act as an
analogue where Congress is silent and judicial policy does not compel
otherwise.
Holmes, however, sanctions the use of antitrust standing precedent, at least as it relates to proximate causation, in private RICO
actions. In fact, the Court apparently decided the Holmes case in
order to redirect lower courts from imposing standing rules based on
other civil analogues of the predicate acts. This is particularly clear
in the O'Connor opinion, which will be relied on in the lower courts
for its closely reasoned analysis of the relationship between the private
securities actions and the private RICO action.
The history of antitrust standing doctrine, however, reveals an
evolution toward ever more restrictive and more policy-based
analysis. 125 Like civil RICO standing, civil antitrust standing doctrine
commenced with broad pronouncements of its scope and liberal interpretation, 126 followed by adoption of a proximate cause standard as
a limit on legal causation.127 The "direct injury" rule followed, restricting categories'l s of injured plaintiffs such as shareholders 129 and creditors.1 ° The practice of categorizing standing decisions by types of
plaintiffs, an approach that the direct injury test invites, provided an
unsatisfactory framework for civil antitrust analysis, primarily because
it required a case-by-case analysis that provided only limited predictive
value and did injury to the goals and purposes of the antitrust laws. 131
Other tests, such as the "target area" test and the "zone of interest"
test 32 became less significant as courts adopted the antitrust injury
doctrine as a limitation on standing. The direct injury rule remains

125. See Daniel Berger & Roger Bernstein, An Analytical Framework-for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977).
126. Id. at 810-11.
127. Id. at 812.
128. Id. at 819-29.
129. See, e.g., Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909); Loeb
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1920).
130. See Loeb, 183 F. at 704; Gerliv Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F. 2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929);
Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1957); see also Note, Standing to Sue for Treble
Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964).
131. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 125, at 819.
132. See Nat Stern & Kevin Getzendammer, Gauging the Impact of Associated General
Contractors on Antitrust Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 20 U.S.D. L. REV. 159
(1986).
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useful for eliminating possible plaintiffs on the basis of procedural
difficulty, such as the problems of apportioning damages, multiple
recovery, and overdeterrence. The task of articulating the relationship
between violation and injury, and relating the injury to the goals and
purposes of the law, is more complex and requires analysis of the
purposes and intended protection of the criminal act on which the civil
case is predicated.133
B. The Limits of Proximate Cause Analysis
Holmes invites application of antitrust standing doctrine in private
civil RICO. In applying Holmes, the lower courts will continue to
encounter aspects of civil RICO that are problematic and require additional standing theory to resolve. That is, limiting RICO recovery
to plaintiffs directly and proximately harmed by a violation of a predicate act will be difficult without a close analysis of the nature of the
harm the predicate acts were designed to prevent and the relationship
between this harm and the plaintiffs injuries. The opinion invites the
type of close analysis of the goals and purposes of the predicate acts
that has been applied in antitrust jurisprudence.
Using Holmes' proximate cause analysis alone, the lower federal
courts will continue to be confronted with the disruptions civil RICO
creates in well-settled areas of federal law. In the federal securities
law area, for example, both the majority opinion and the O'Connor
opinion maintain the possible availability of private RICO in a wellframed securities fraud case brought by a non-purchaser or seller of
securities. Yet it is extraordinarily unlikely that Congress intended,
through RICO, to overturn Supreme Court precedent limiting standing
to purchasers or sellers, simply because the plaintiff could demonstrate
a scheme accompanied by two or more mailings. As Justice Scalia
suggests, it makes little sense, in the absence of a clear textual distinction in the legislation, for the Court to assume that Congress intended
to protect one type of plaintiff injured by a violation of section 10b
when recovery is sought in civil RICO and another type of plaintiff
when other civil remedies are invoked. -

133. William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 97 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1980); Note, Antitrust Injury and Standing: A Question
of Legal Cause, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1011, 1103 (1983).
134. Of course, Justice Scalia took issue with the Courts' inference of a civil remedy for a
§ 10b violation. One could infer from Justice Scalia's analysis that he would seek a basis for
civil RICO standing in the goals and purposes of § 10b.
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Private RICO, even with proximate cause/direct injury limitations,
wreaks havoc with the delicate public policy balances embodied in
competition law, 135 in labor law, 136 in patent law, 137 and other areas of
federal public policy. This characteristic of civil RICO was expressed
by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Sedima, where he pressed for
more restrictive standing doctrine:
[T]he broad reading of the civil RICO provision also displaces
important areas of federal law ....
[I]t virtually eliminates
decades of legislative and judicial development of private
civil remedies under the federal securities laws. . . . The
effect of civil RICO on federal remedies schemes is not limited to the securities laws. For example, even though commodities fraud is not a predicate offense listed in § 1961, the
carefully crafted private damages cause of action under the
Commodities Exchange Act may be circumvented in a commodities case through civil RICO actions
alleging mail or
13
wire fraud. . . . The list goes on and on.
Private RICO also has disrupted the balance of civil remedies in
state and federal law. Undoubtedly, Congress intended for RICO to
do just that with respect to the criminal law, for the essence of RICO
is that it federalized the organized and continued violation of state as
well as federal law, placing federal prosecutorial resources at the task
of halting organized crime in the United States. It is less clear that

135. In Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod., 930 F.2d 277, 286 (1991), the Third Circuit
granted RICO standing to a competitor of the defendant allegedly injured by the defendant's
failure to comply with a judicial antitrust divestiture order, even though a competitor would
not have standing to enforce the divestiture order directly. See Maurer, supra note 44 (judicially
crafted antitrust law, designed to facilitate efficient industrial organization and protect consumer
welfare, is easily displaced and its goals thwarted, by private RICO actions).
136. Brennan v. Chestnut, 1992 WL 200284 (8th Cir. Aug. 22, 1992); Talbot v. Robert
Mathews Dist. Co., 961 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1992). See Victoria G.T. Bassetti, Note, Weeding
RICO Out of Garden Variety Labor Disputes, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 103 (1992) (the private RICO
action "threatens to erode the foundations of labor law"). American labor law, observes Bassetti,
is "an integrated, cohesive system of penalties and remedies," designed to maintain a relative
balance of power between labor unions and employers and force the parties to the bargaining
table. Bassetti, supra at 126. While prosecutorial discretion to bring criminal suits can be used
to check illegal union activities without disrupting the public policy of labor relations, the private
civil RICO suit becomes a club in the hand of the union against management, or management
against the union, threatening to displace major parts of labor law and threatening its coherence.
137. See Steven Fasman, The ProperApplication of Civil RICO to Patent Fraud,96 YALE
L.J. 1323 (1987).
138. Sedinm, 473 U.S. at 504 (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Powell, J.J., dissenting).
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Congress intended to federalize the state common law actions139 by
placing the federal civil courts and access to the treble damage action
in the hands of private plaintiffs who have no ethic of prosecutorial
restraint or incentive to avoid displacing state law.14 While there is
ample support for this view of Congress' intent with respect to the
criminal law, the record is scant with respect to the civil action.
In various contexts, the lower courts confront civil RICO actions
that are brought under section 1964(c) in order to circumvent established restrictions on the scope of other civil actions available to redress
violations of the criminal law. In other contexts, for example where
civil RICO actions are brought using federal mail fraud and wire fraud
as predicate acts, courts may confront fact situations in which a federal
prosecutor, exercising prosecutorial discretion, would not bring a criminal action. Nevertheless, a private plaintiff, exploiting the expansive
precedents of criminal mail and wire fraud, may bring a section 1964(c)
action for civil recovery.1 41 Because almost all elements of civil and
criminal RICO are identical, except the language of the section 1964(c)
action, courts have little leeway to restrict the civil action while adhering to the criminal precedents.

V.

THE SCALIA OPINION REVISITED: TOWARD A
BETTER DECISION MODEL

The relatively undifferentiated approach to RICO standing that
the Souter opinion reaches in its proximate cause/direct injury test is
reminiscent of the Supreme Court's earlier attempts to fashion standing rules under Clayton Act section 4. Like the earlier uses of direct-

139. Note, however, that a federal court in a civil RICO case often must look to state
common law to identify the legal "property" interest lost by the plaintiff. See Leach v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 860 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1988) cert. denied 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
140. In the context of civil RICO . . . the restraining influence of prosecutors is
completely absent. Unlike the Government, private litigants have no reason to
avoid displacing state common-law remedies. Quite to the contrary, such litigants,
lured by the prospect of treble damages and attorney's fees, have a strong incentive
to invoke RICO's provisions whenever they can allege in good faith two instances
of mail or wire fraud. Then the defendant, facing a tremendous financial exposure
in addition to the threat of being labelled a "racketeer," will have a strong interest
in settling the dispute. . . . The civil RICO provision consequently stretches the
mail and wire fraud statutes to their absolute limits and federalizes important areas
of civil litigation that until now were solely within the domain of the states.
Sedina, 473 U.S. at 504 (Marshall J., dissenting). See Abrams, supra note 3 at 7.
141. For a discussion of this problem and a proposed solution to it, see Abrams, supra
note 3.
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ness in antitrust, however, the Souter test does not account for the
externalities private RICO actions impose on the federal-state balance
or on the public policy embodied in the underlying substantive law of
the predicate acts. The jurisprudence of proximate cause and directness alone does not require courts to consider whether the goal of the
predicate act was to protect persons like the plaintiff from suffering
the kinds of injuries suffered by the plaintiff. To reach such issues
requires more probing standing doctrine.
The Scalia "zone of interests" test, does invite such analysis:
[T]he "zone of interest" test.., seeks to determine whether,
apart from the directness of the injury, the plaintiff is within
the class of persons sought to be benefitted by the provision
at issue. ...
It seems to me obvious that the proximate-cause test and
the zone-of-interests test that will be applied to the various
causes of action created [by § 1964] are not uniform, but
vary according to the nature of the criminal offenses upon
2
which those causes of action are based.14
This test seeks a connection between the plaintiffs loss and the type
of injury the law of the predicate act was designed to prevent.
In rejecting the "racketeering injury" concept, the Sedima Court
pointed the way to such an approach to RICO standing. Sedima recognized the injury compensable in RICO as "necessarily... the harm
caused by the predicate acts . . . for the essence of the violation is
the commission of these acts in connection with the conduct of an
enterprise.' ' 1 The Scalia opinion in Holmes, however, recognizes
explicitly that the substantive law of the criminal predicate acts is
rooted in various public policies. RICO reinforces those public policies
by federalizing the crimes and providing a treble damage remedy for
their repeated violations by, or in the context of operating, organizations.
The policy that undergirds RICO does not lend itself to independent
standing analysis. For that, one must look to the harm inherent in
commission of the criminal act, to the public policy of the underlying
predicate act. Criminal law is primarily punitive; a social interest is
implicated when a crime is committed and the offender is punished.
It is not necessary to identify the precise incidence of injury caused

142.
143.

Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1326.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479.
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by violation of the criminal act. The prosecutor alleges and proves
commission of the crime.
The civil law, in contrast, is remedial and deterrent. The law must
identify the precise interest of the plaintiff in order to determine
whether that interest has been harmed by the criminal violation and
to know whether that interest is protected by the criminal statute;
only harms caused by the violation of the criminal statute are remedied
or deterred. Standing doctrine is the crucible for this determination.
RICO, like the Clayton Act, provides a civil remedy for a criminal
act. The judicial experience with the Clayton Act demonstrates the
need for standing doctrine that connects the plaintiffs injuries to the
goals and purposes of the underlying law.
The Scalia opinion points the way toward a better decision model
for civil RICO standing decisions. In such a model, the civil RICO
plaintiff would be required to allege and prove a relationship between
the injury and the purpose of the predicate criminal law violated to
show that the plaintiffs harm lay within the zone-of-interest protected
by the predicate statute. This would require courts to parse goals and
legislative intent more precisely. The model would have the advantage
of providing an analytical framework for courts to weigh or to harmonize competing social values as part of the specific determination
of which injuries caused by violation of the predicate criminal law
should be remedied under the civil RICO statute. In addition, this
model would provide a jurisprudential means for the courts to harmonize competing civil causes of action for violation of the same substantive criminal statute. Such a model is consistent with Justice
Scalia's goal for the zone of interest analysis:
It also seems to me obvious that unless some reason for
making a distinction exists, the background zone-of-interest
test applied to one cause of action for harm caused by violation of a particular criminal provision should be the same as
the test applied to another cause of action for harm caused
by violation of the same provision. 144
The "antitrust injury" rule represents the equivalent of this test
in the section 4 Clayton Act action. In essence, the antitrust injury
doctrine requires the section 4 plaintiff to allege and prove that the
injury it suffered is the kind of injury the antitrust laws were designed
to prevent. This concept, which is a refinement of basic causation

144.

Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1328 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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analysis, has proved to be a powerful analytical tool in antitrust. It
has forced explicit analysis of the purpose and goals of the law. Prior
to the development of the antitrust injury doctrine, courts employed
more vague and unpredictable tools of standing analysis, much as the
RICO standing rulings have provided. As the courts continually and
explicitly articulated antitrust goals, however, the standing of a section
4 plaintiff became more clear and predictable.
RICO jurisprudence will require more complex standing analysis,
as Justice Scalia has suggested, because each underlying criminal statute has a different legislative and judicial history. Proper jurisprudence
will require careful articulation of the zone-of-interest for each predicate act. In this way, however, the court can place rational boundaries
on a civil remedy based on violation of a criminal statute.
VI. CONCLUSION

In Holmes, the United States Supreme Court initiated cohesive
standing law for the civil RICO action. By adopting explicitly the
relatively restrictive approach to causation that antitrust jurisprudence takes, the Court signalled its willingness to refine, define and
rationalize the private treble damages action in RICO, as it has done
in antitrust actions. This decision departs from the Court's previous
eschewal of antitrust precedent and its previous tendency to read
literally the section 1964(c) statute. Presumably, the Court has abandoned hope that Congress will relieve it of this interpretive task;
therefore, it has begun the process of reasoning by analogy from the
jurisprudence surrounding section 4 Clayton Act.
This process will lead, and should lead, inevitably, to creation of
a RICO analogue to the antitrust injury rule. The roots of such a rule
lie in Justice Scalia's "zone-of-interests" test. As the lower courts
apply the proximate cause test of the majority opinion, they will be
forced to identify the foreseeable harms Congress sought to prevent
by each predicate criminal statute. Closer inquiry will reveal the wisdom of Justice Scalia's leap to a more specific, and more policy-based,
test for standing. Within this test lies the potential for harmonizing
the relationship of civil RICO and other state and federal remedial
schemes.

